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Abstract—Software Defined Networking (SDN) enables flexible
and scalable network control and management. However, it also
introduces new vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers.
In particular, low-rate and slow or stealthy Denial-of-Service
(DoS) attacks are recently attracting attention from researchers
because of their detection challenges. In this paper, we propose
a novel machine learning based defense framework named Q-
MIND, to effectively detect and mitigate stealthy DoS attacks
in SDN-based networks. We first analyze the adversary model
of stealthy DoS attacks, the related vulnerabilities in SDN-based
networks and the key characteristics of stealthy DoS attacks. Next,
we describe and analyze an anomaly detection system that uses a
Reinforcement Learning-based approach based on Q-Learning in
order to maximize its detection performance. Finally we outline
the complete Q-MIND defense framework that incorporates the
optimal policy derived from the Q-Learning agent to efficiently
defeat stealthy DoS attacks in SDN-based networks. An extensive
comparison of the Q-MIND framework and currently existing
methods shows that significant improvements in attack detection
and mitigation performance are obtained by Q-MIND.
Index Terms—Machine learning, Feature engineering, Stealthy
Denial-of-Service attacks, Software Defined Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed DoS (DDoS)
attacks [1] can cause serious damage on any networked system.
Recently also new DDoS attack variants like stealthy and silent
saturation DDoS attacks (also named low-rate and slow DoS
attacks) [2] are observed. Current networks do not yet provide
sufficient and efficient countermeasures to defense against
these type of attacks [1]. A global view of the network state
and traffic situation is required for effective attack mitigation.
The Software Defined Networking (SDN) concept [3] is a
promising approach to tackle the attack detection and miti-
gation problem as it can provide a fine grained view on the
traffic flows by appropriately setting the flow matching fields
in the SDN switches. Although, SDN offers a great potential
to defend against novel DoS attack types like stealthy DoS
attacks, it is also vulnerable to these attacks, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. For example, SDN-based forwarding devices, i.e.,
OpenFlow switches [3], can suffer from overflow problems
caused by a silent saturation DoS attack [2], [4], [5].
Stealthy DoS attacks are very difficult to be detected by
network operators without accessing the victim machine as
the attacker behaves similar to clients with a bad network
connection [6]. Even there are some research efforts [4],
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Fig. 1. Representation of stealthy DoS attacks in the SDN environment
[5], [7]–[10] to detect silent DoS attacks, network operations
currently still rely on random [4], predefined threshold-based
[8] or complex high effort [7] mechanisms. None of these
mechanisms utilize machine learning techniques to provide an
early detection of stealthy DoS attacks.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose a novel machine
learning based defense framework called Q-MIND, to effec-
tively detect and mitigate stealthy DoS attacks in SDN-based
networks. We first analyze the adversary model of stealthy
DoS attacks, the related vulnerabilities in SDN-based networks
and the key characteristics of stealthy DoS attacks. Next, we
describe and analyze a detection system that uses a Reinforce-
ment Learning-based approach based on Q-Learning in order
to maximize its detection performance. Finally we outline
the complete Q-MIND defense framework that incorporates
the optimal policy derived from the Q-Learning agent to
efficiently defeat stealthy DoS attacks in SDN-based networks.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II provides
some information about stealthy DoS adversary models and
existing countermeasures. Section III outlines the architecture
of a machine learning based stealthy DoS attack detection
system. Section IV presents our approach for optimizing the
attack detection performance via Q-Learning. The complete
Q-MIND framework is described in section V and the results
of the performance analysis are outlined in Section VI. Section
VII concludes the paper.
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II. STEALTHY DOS ATTACKS
A. Basic Principle
Recently a new type of Denial-of-Service (DoS) or Dis-
tributed DoS (DDoS) attacks [1] were identified - stealthy
and silent saturation attacks also called low-rate and slow DoS
attacks [2]. These attacks work differently than the high-rate
and volumetric DoS attacks. Instead of sending requests to
the victim server with a as high as possible rate, attackers
periodically send requests with low rate consuming only little
resources to render the victim server inaccessible. Stealthy
DoS attacks are very hard to be detected in non-SDN networks
without accessing the victim machine as the attacker behaves
similar to clients with a bad network connection [6]. During
the attack, attackers may exhibit an ON-OFF attack pattern
which comprises consecutive periods of inactivity (called off-
time) and activity (called on-time). Once a stealthy DoS attack
has seized all memory space for active connections in a Web
server, the attacker tries to keep these connections open as long
as possible by exploiting the characteristics of either a specific
protocol (e.g., HTTP, DNS) or the application software (e.g.,
PHP, SOAP) [7], [8].
B. Vulnerabilities in Software Defined Networks w.r.t. Stealthy
DoS Attacks
If the SDN control plane implements a simple flow match-
ing strategy, e.g., only using destination MAC or IP addresses,
the ability to track and monitor network traffic for security
or forensic analysis is limited. Therefore in order to detect
malicious traffic flows stemming from stealthy DoS attacks a
more sophisticated flow matching comprising further packet
header fields (e.g., IP source addresses) has to be deployed.
However, such a flow matching strategy leads to much more
flow entries in the SDN switch, so that the maximum number
of flow entries might be reached quite soon which then would
cause a significant degradation of the forwarding performance
or even outage of the switch. Fig. 1 illustrates stealthy DoS
attacks in the SDN environment. An SDN switch is able to
simultaneously maintain only a limited number of flow rules,
e.g., 2000-3000 flow rules (in case of an OpenvSwitch, [4])
as the flow rules are stored in power-hungry and expensive
Ternary Content Addressable Memory. Therefore, attackers
can easily compromise an SDN switch by sending new packets
which do not match to any current flow rules in the switch. As
the current flow rules are preserved, this dramatically increases
the number of flow rules in the switch. Consequently, not only
the server becomes the victim of a stealthy DoS attack, but
also the SDN control and data plane components suffer from
resource exhaustion [4], [5]. Normally, in case of stealthy DoS
attacks the number of flow rules do not exceed the flow-
table capacity in the SDN switches. Therefore it is a quite
challenging task for an anomaly detection mechanism to detect
these type of attacks [5], [6]. To our best knowledge, there are
no previous studies that completely solved the stealthy DoS
attack detection problem so far.
C. Existing Countermeasures
The problem of precise detection and mitigation of stealthy
DoS attacks is already addressed in the SDN research commu-
nity. The authors in [4] propose a method which monitors the
number of flow entries in SDN switches and, after exceeding a
threshold, randomly drops flow rule entries. However there is a
probability of dropping flows of legitimate clients as well. The
detection technique proposed in [7] monitors every incoming
flow and calculates suspiciousness scores. But it requires a
high effort to store and analyze information of all flows. The
authors in [8] recommend that if the number of incomplete
HTTP requests are larger than a threshold, a defense scheme
is triggered to drop incomplete request flows. The threshold
value might differ from server to server. In addition, in order
to prevent attackers from probing idle and hard timeout values
in the target SDN-based network, the authors in [5] propose
to generate an artificial jitter and set a dynamic timeout for
incoming packets. This technique however induces the control
plane to process more packet-in messages leading to extra
forwarding delays for benign packets. Overflow problems in
SDN switches caused by a stealthy DoS attack might be solved
by a flow table sharing scheme with neighbor switches [9]
whenever an attack occurs. However, in case of a massive
attack, neighbor switches can be flooded by the victim switch
and the whole network might suspend operation. In [10], the
authors propose to validate source IP addresses by querying
the log and if the number of packets/second and the number of
bytes/second sent from a source IP address exceed a threshold,
the flow rules related to the source IP address are removed in
the SDN switch.
All mentioned existing methods for stealthy DoS/DDoS at-
tack detection rely on either random [4], predefined threshold-
based [8] or high effort [7] mechanisms. This motivated us
to propose a machine learning based approach to efficiently
detect and mitigate stealthy DoS attacks at an early stage. To
our best knowledge, our proposal is the first one applying
machine learning based detection for stealthy DoS attacks.
D. Characteristics of Stealthy DoS Attacks
One of the key characteristics of stealthy DoS attacks is
that it does not matter whether attackers use non-spoofed or
spoofed IP addresses to generate malicious requests to a victim
server - see Fig. 1. This is because in case the SDN network
applies a traffic flow matching mechanism comprising layer 3
(IP addresses) and layer 4 (TCP/UDP ports), abnormal source
IP addresses have to be used repeatedly to keep flow rules
related to attack traffic alive. Otherwise, flow rules of the used
sources will be removed after a flow idle_timeout. Therefore,
for traffic anomaly detection it is feasible to rely on source IP
addresses and categorise incoming traffic flows accordingly.
This motivated us to develop a source-based mechanism for
detecting stealthy DoS attacks.
III. BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF THE STEALTHY DOS
ATTACK DETECTION SYSTEM
Fig. 2 (a) shows the architecture model of a stealthy DoS
detection/mitigation system residing in the SDN application
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Fig. 2. Stealthy DoS attack detection system as an SDN application. (a)
System overview, and (b) Feature and AI/ML algorithm selection through
Reinforcement Learning
plane. Regarding the system operation, first of all data from
the network is gathered - for example the northbound APIs
(see Fig. 1) can be used to query for statistics data from the
SDN controller. Detailed statistics information of individual
traffic flows in the SDN switches is periodically collected by
the SDN controller. Afterwards, the collected data is post-
processed in multiple steps. The feature engineering module
extracts from the collected data for each source-specific traffic
flow a set of features, e.g., the average packets per flow,
average packet size per flow, packet change ratio, flow change
ratio, etc.. Out of these features the optimum ones (identified
by the AOS, see below) are taken and fed into the chosen
Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML) algorithm.
The task of the AI/ML algorithm is to classify (based on
the selected features) each source IP address into a normal
one or malicious one. In case an attack source IP address
is recognized the attack mitigation policy creation module
formulates a policy for removing malicious source-specific
flow rules and blocking the malicious source. The northbound
APIs are utilized again to tell the SDN controller to deploy
the attack mitigation policies in the data plane.
The application operator and scheduler (AOS) plays an
important role in selecting the optimal feature sets and the
AI/ML algorithms for an efficient detection operation. The
AOS is only active in the training phase, i.e., before the actual
runtime operation of the detection system. In the training phase
we require a set of labelled traffic data including abnormal and
benign samples. This data is either generated by performing
simulation experiments of stealthy DoS attacks in an SDN en-
vironment or generated from publicly available data sets [11].
The AOS utilizes the labelled data set to train a chosen AI/ML
algorithm with a feature set, and afterwards conducts a cross-
validation test to evaluate the attack detection performance for
the selected combination of feature set and AI/ML algorithm.
Hence, the AOS can adjust these selections to achieve the
best attack detection performance. Nonetheless, in practice,
selecting an optimal set of features and a suitable AI/ML
algorithm is challenging for every classification problem [12]
as there are many possible combinations. Therefore, in the
following, we introduce an optimal selection algorithm based
on reinforcement learning [13] that can supervise the optimum
selection of the features and AI/ML algorithms.
IV. OPTIMUM SELECTION OF FEATURES AND
AI/ML-BASED CLASSIFICATION ALGORITHMS
In order to achieve the optimum combination of a certain
feature set and a specific AI/ML algorithm w.r.t. the anomaly
detection performance, we adopt the f inite Markov Decision
Process (MDP) approach [13] with episodic tasks. The MDP
framework allows the AOS to take an optimal action (combi-
nation of feature set and AI/ML algorithm) based on its ob-
servations in order to maximize its immediate reward in every
single episode. The reward is expressed in terms of multiple
evaluation criteria - see below. The MDP is characterized by
<S,A,r>, where S is the state space, A is the action space,
and r is the immediate reward of the detection system. For
evaluating the anomaly detection performance of an action
(feature set and AI/ML algorithm), we consider common
metrics [14] including precision (Pr ), recall (Re), F-score (Fs),
accuracy (Ac), and false alarm rate (Fa). These metrics are
calculated from the following observations: TP (True Positive)
- number of attacks precisely detected; TN (True Negative)
- number of normal patterns precisely classified; FP (False
Positive) - number of normal patterns incorrectly classified;
and FN (False Negative) - number of attacks unsuccessfully
detected. The details of the MDP model are outlined hereafter.
1) State Space: Formally, we can define the state space of
the detection system as follows:
S , {(Pr,Re,Fs, Ac,Fa)}, (1)
where Pr = TPTP+FP ∈ [0,1], Re = TPTP+FN ∈ [0,1], Fs =
2
1/Pr+1/Re ∈ [0,1], Ac = TP+TNTP+TN+FP+FN ∈ [0,1] and Fa =
FP
FP+TN ∈ [0,1]. Then, the state of the detection system is
defined as a vector s = (Pr,Re,Fs, Ac,Fa) ∈ S.
2) Action Space: F = { f1, f2, ..., fm} denotes a group of
feasible feature sets composed of all available and suited
features, e.g., a feature set fm consists of 4 features (average
packets per flow, average packet size per flow, packet change
ratio and flow change ratio). L = {l1, l2, ..., ln} represents a set
of possible AI/ML algorithms that can be used for traffic flow
classification, e.g., Support Vector Machine [12], Random
Forest [14], and Self Organizing Map [15]. Then, a tuple,
< fm, ln >, is referred as a combination of a feature set and
an AI/ML algorithm. Applying a tuple < fm, ln > to the
environment, i.e., the detection system - see Fig. 2 (b), means
an action is taken by the AOS component. Therefore, the action
space is defined as:
A , {a : a =< fm, ln >; fm ∈ F ; ln ∈ L}. (2)
3) Immediate Reward Function: As aforementioned, we
evaluate the anomaly detection performance of a tuple <
fm, ln > by five criteria. Hence, we define the immediate
reward function of the detection system after the AOS takes
an action a at state s as the following fitness function:
r(s,a) =WPr Pr +WReRe +WFsFs +WAc Ac +WFa e−Fa, (3)
where WPr ,WRe,WFs ,WAc and WFa are weight factors related
to the corresponding evaluation criteria, and WPr +WRe +
WFs +WAc +WFa = 1. Note that after performing an action, the
AOS observes the feedback from the environment (detection
system), i.e., the state vector and the reward value.
4) Optimization Formulation: We define an optimization
problem to acquire the optimal policy pi∗(s), being in state
s that maximizes the immediate reward in each episode. In
particular, in a state s expressed as a vector including Pr ,
Re, Fs , Ac and Fa, the policy yields an optimal action or
a tuple < fm, ln > to maximize the immediate reward of the
detection system as defined by Equation 3. The action space
A comprises of mn possible actions. Then, the optimization
problem is formulated as follows:
max
pi
{ri(si, pi(si)) : ri ∈ R; si ∈ S;pi(si) ∈ A;1 ≤ i ≤ mn}, (4)
where ri(si ,pi(si)) is the immediate reward value associated
with policy pi at time step i in an episode.
For solving the optimization problem we apply the Q-
Learning [13] algorithm which basically is a Reinforcement
Learning approach. By that, the AOS is able to perform an
optimal selection without requiring prior knowledge about a
set of features and the associated AI/ML algorithm. In other
words, we aim to find the optimal policy pi∗ : S −→A, i.e., a
state-action or state-feature set and AI/ML algorithm mapping
table to maximize the anomaly detection performance for
stealthy DoS attacks. To achieve these aims, the AOS builds
a Q-table based on a Q-Learning algorithm to store all state-
action pair combinations (see Fig. 2 (b)). In a given state si
at iteration i in an episode, the Q-Learning agent selects an
action ai based on its current selection strategy. Afterwards,
it observes the immediate reward ri and the new state si+1,
and updates the Q-table using a Q-function. In other words,
the Q-Learning agent can learn from its own decisions at each
iteration, and it will converge to the optimal policy pi∗ after a
certain number of iterations [13].
Let us denote ϑpi(s) : S −→ R as the expected return of a
state s under a policy pi generally, that is formed as follows:
ϑpi(s) = Epi
[
mn∑
i=1
γri(si,ai)|si = s
]
= Epi[ri(si,ai)
+γϑpi(si+1)|si = s],
(5)
where γ ∈[0, 1) is a discount factor that indicates the impor-
tance of the long-term reward [13]. However, as in our opti-
mization formulation only the immediate reward is considered,
γ is set to 0 in the remaining of the paper. The optimal policy
pi∗ in state s represents an action a which yields the maximum
value ϑ∗(s):
ϑ∗(s) =max
a
{Epi [ri(si,ai)|si = s]} ,∀s ∈ S. (6)
Hence, for all state-action (s,a) pairs, the optimal Q-functions
are defined as:
Q∗(s,a) , ri(si,ai),∀s ∈ S. (7)
Thus, ϑ∗(s) can be expressed as ϑ∗(s) = maxa {Q∗(s,a)}. By
iteratively conducting different actions the optimal value of the
Q-function [13], i.e., Q∗(s,a), for all state-action (s,a) pairs is
found. The Q-function is updated at each iteration using the
following equation:
Qi+1(si,ai) = Qi(si,ai)+αi[ri(si,ai)−Qi(si,ai)], (8)
a i r is i
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Fig. 3. Q-MIND framework for defeating stealthy DoS attacks in SDN
where si = (Pr,Re,Fs, Ac,Fa), ai =< fm, ln > and αi is the
learning rate [13]. The αi value can be a either constant
or dynamically adjusted during the learning operation. In
addition, to mitigate the exploration and exploitation dilemma
that has direct impact on the convergence rate of any learning
algorithms, the epsilon-greedy algorithm [13] is used. Instead
of always taking the best action according to the current state,
the Q-Learning algorithm will then take random actions, and
the probability of a random decision is determined by the value
of  . Accordingly, the learning operation is terminated when
all Q values in the Q-table converge.
In conclusion, the Q-learning algorithm yields the optimal
policy pi∗(s) for a state s, i.e., an action a, that needs to be
taken by the AOS module to maximize the value of the Q∗(s,a)
function, i.e., pi∗(s) = argmaxaQ∗(s,a). Algorithm 1 provides
details of the Q-Learning algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Deriving Optimal Policy with Q-Learning
1: Inputs: F ;L; for a state-action pair (s,a) ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A,
then initialize a Q-table entry with Q(s,a) value arbitrarily,
α and  , respectively.
2: begin
3: Repeat the following loop for each episode.
4: loop
5: Current state si .
6: Execute action ai according an exploratory policy ().
7: Obtain the immediate reward ri and new state si+1.
8: Update Q(si ,ai) by using Equation 8.
9: Replace si←− si+1.
10: end loop
11: Outputs pi∗(s) = argmaxaQ∗(s,a).
V. Q-MIND FRAMEWORK
In this section the design and operation of the complete Q-
MIND framework for detecting and mitigating stealthy DoS
attacks is outlined.
A. Q-MIND Architecture
As depicted in Fig. 3, the Q-MIND framework comprises
the following modules: a Data Preprocessing module; a Q-
Learning agent residing in the AOS component for opti-
mizing the anomaly detection performance; an AI/ML-based
anomaly detection system controlled by the Q-Learning agent;
a Knowledge Database for storing information about feasible
features and AI/ML algorithms; and an Attack Mitigation
Policy Creation module that issues and implements mitigation
rules into the data plane to block stealthy DoS attack traffic.
B. Q-MIND Operation
The operation of Q-MIND is described by Algorithm 2.
First of all, Q-MIND runs the Q-Learning agent to build a Q-
table and then generates the optimum action or combination of
feature set fm and AI/ML algorithm ln as explained earlier. The
labeled data set for the training and cross-validation phase is
either obtained from simulation experiments of stealthy DoS
attacks in an SDN environment or generated from publicly
available data sets [11]. Note that in order to verify the correct-
ness of the anomaly detection, the Q-Learning agent conducts
cross-validation tests after having trained the detection engine.
After the initialization (training and cross-validation) part
(lines 1-3) is finished, Q-MIND enters the runtime phase
detecting and mitigating stealthy DoS attacks by executing the
loop part of Algorithm 2. The initialization part as well as the
loop part can be adjusted lateron in case that further suitable
features are identified by the Data Preprocessing module.
Algorithm 2 Q-MIND Operation
1: Build a Q-table by Algorithm 1.
2: Derive the optimal action < fm, ln > from the Q-table.
3: Implement a feature set fm and an AI/ML algorithm ln
into the detection system.
4: loop
5: Collect traffic statistics data from the data plane.
6: Extract features from statistics data.
7: Feed features to optimal AI/ML-based detection engine.
8: Get detection result for each source IP address (normal
or attack).
9: Create attack mitigation policies if a source IP address
is an attacker.
10: Propagate and implement policies to the data plane.
11: end loop
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of the Q-MIND framework and present some results of
our performance analysis.
A. Evaluation Scenario Setup
We perform our experiments by using MaxiNet [16] to
emulate a simple SDN-based network including a Web server
and 8 hosts (4 benign and 4 malicious hosts). The Web
server and all hosts are implemented in Linux containers
and connect to an OpenFlow switch (OpenvSwitch). The
SDN network is controlled by an ONOS SDN controller
[17]. We consider three well-known AI/ML based classifiers
including Support Vector Machine (SVM-supervised learning)
[12], Random Forest (RF-supervised learning) [14] and Self
Organizing Maps (SOM-unsupervised learning) [15], hence
L = {SVM,RF,SOM}. The applied feature set F is created
by the following 10 suitable features: average packets per
flow, average packet size per flow, packet change ratio, flow
change ratio, average duration per flow, percentage of pair-
flows, growth of different ports, average flow inter-arrival-
time, fraction of TCP flows over total incoming flows and
entropy of incoming flows. These features are extracted for
each source IP address taken from a traffic data set including
4000 normal traffic samples and 4000 attack samples. The
traffic data set is obtained from our simulation of stealthy DoS
attacks in the SDN scenario described above. Accordingly, the
Q-Learning agent is instructed to train the detection engine
and to conduct cross-validation tests. It should be noted that
an AI/ML algorithm requires at least 2 features, and that the
weight values in Equation 3 are set to 0.2 each.
To evaluate the Q-MIND framework, we first compare our
optimized anomaly detection solution based on Q-Learning
with three other AI/ML-based anomaly detection/classification
methods that apply different feature selection techniques,
namely a Principal Component Analysis with a SVM clas-
sifier (PCASVM) [12], a Generic Algorithm with a SVM
classifier (GASVM) [12] and a Binary Bat Algorithm with
a RF classifier (BBARF) [14]. We evaluate the stealthy DoS
attack detection performance both in the cross-validation and
in the runtime phase. In a second step, we compare the
stealthy DoS attack mitigation performance of our Q-MIND
framework applying the optimal policy and a threshold-based
SIFT method [4]. For attack mitigation, we delete all flows
stemming from source IP addresses that were identified to
belong to attackers and then install flow rules to block these
malicious sources for a certain period of time, e.g., 30 seconds.
B. Numerical Results and Analysis
1) Convergence of the selection algorithm (training and
cross-validation phase): First of all we investigate the stealthy
DoS attack detection performance during the training and
cross-validation phase of Q-MIND. As can be seen in Fig.
4 (a), in case of Q-MIND, the anomaly detection performance
(derived from the fitness function in Equation 3) fluctuates
during the first 100 iterations of the training and cross-
validation phase because the Q-Learning agent frequently
updates its Q-table in the beginning of the learning phase.
Thereafter, it becomes stable and achieves a value of 0.955
for the optimal policy. The other anomaly detection schemes
(that operate with fixed classification algorithms and different
feature selection techniques) perform well in the first iterations
but do not improve anymore in the remaining time. As Q-
MIND is able to apply different combinations of classification
algorithms and feature sets due to the Q-Learning approach, it
finally finds the optimum policy that yields the best detection
performance. In the considered scenario the optimal action
turns out to be a combination of a 4-feature set and the SOM .
2) Attack detection performance applying the optimal policy
(runtime phase): In the next step we perform experiments in
the MaxiNet emulation framework to evaluate the stealthy DoS
Fig. 4. Stealthy DoS attack detection performance comparison
Fig. 5. Stealthy DoS attack mitigation performance comparison
attack detection performance of Q-MIND in the runtime phase.
The results are shown in Fig. 4 (b). It can be observed that
using the optimal policy, the Q-MIND framework outperforms
the three other methods in all five evaluation criteria and
achieves results which are near to the optimal results obtained
in the cross-validation phase with the optimal policy. In [4],
it is reported that a stealthy DoS attack where 39.5 unique
packets/s are sent to an SDN switch (OpenvSwitch) causes
the switch to be overflowed (table-full event) after just 38.0
seconds (Time to DoS). We record the average detection time
of the Q-MIND framework and compare it with the Time to
DoS values reported in [4], as shown in Fig. 4 (c). The results
show that the Q-MIND framework takes much less time to
detect stealthy DoS attacks with different attack rates and that
it completely avoids the overflow problem in the switch.
3) Attack mitigation performance: In order to evaluate the
attack mitigation performance we measure the percentage of
correctly dropped malicious flow rules in the switch and the
request response time of the Web server when the network
is under attack. As shown in Fig. 5 (a), Q-MIND achieves
a very good percentage of correctly dropped attack flows
because it implements policies as soon as a source IP address
is detected to stem from an attacker. Contrary the SIFT method
randomly drops flows only after the switch gets overflowed,
hence malicious flows always remain in the switch. From Fig.
5 (b) one can see that Q-MIND also guarantees an acceptable
response time and that it again outperforms the SIFT method.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a novel machine learning based
framework, named Q-MIND, to effectively defense against
stealthy DoS attacks in SDN-based networks. We conduct
a comprehensive analysis of the anomaly detection system
which incorporates a Reinforcement Learning scheme (Q-
Learning algorithm) to maximize the anomaly detection per-
formance. Our performance evaluation results demonstrate that
Q-MIND applying the optimal policy from the Q-Learning
agent achieves a higher stealthy DoS attack detection and
mitigation performance than currently existing methods.
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